On March 21, 2011, AT&T announced that it will buy T-Mobile from Deutsche Telekom for $39 billion. This transaction will be tax-free to Deutsche Telekom ("DT") not because it qualifies as a reorganization, but because DT is a foreign corporation and capital gains of non-residents are generally not subject to US taxation because they are deemed to be foreign source. In addition, DT is protected from taxation by Article 13(5) of the US-Germany tax treaty, which provides that capital gains are generally taxable only by the country of residence.
However, Germany will not tax DT on its gain either, because like most OECD countries, it does not tax gains on the sale of shares that qualify for the participation exemption. 2 Thus, the portion of the $39 billion that represents gain will escape taxation altogether.
Is this result justified? From an economic perspective, the answer is no. A capital gain on the sale of shares is the sum of the accumulated earnings of the company plus the present value of its future anticipated earnings. If a US company distributes earnings to its foreign parent as a dividend, they would usually be subject to tax by the US. While the US company is subject to tax on its income as it earns it, under our tax system the parent is normally also subject to tax on a dividend of the same earnings. 3 There is no reason not to treat capital gains in the same way as dividends since they represent the same earnings. 4 In addition, if DT 1 Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LLM, the University of Michigan. I would like to thank Yariv Brauner, Ehab Farah, Oz Halabi… 2 For a survey of the practice in OECD countries see Joint Committee on Taxation, Background and Selected Issues Related to the U.S. International Tax System and Systems that Exempt Foreign Business Income, JCX-33-11 (May 20, 2011) . 3 As long as we do not adopt full integration, dividends will generally continue to be taxed in the hands of shareholders. I do not believe we are likely to adopt full integration, nor do I think we should, especially in the international context. See AviYonah, Back to the 1930s? The Shaky Case for Exempting Dividends, 97 Tax Notes 1599 (Dec. 23, 2002) . 4 There are two reasons why capital gains of foreign sellers should be taxed even if dividends are not (as happens under some of our recent treaties where the direct dividend withholding tax rate is zero, including the US-Germany treaty). First, taxing had been a US corporation, it would have been subject to full taxation on the gain inherent in the $39 billion, without even the benefit of a lower rate.
Moreover, it is likely that the economic source of the $39 billion is mostly from the US. T-Mobile is a cellular phone service provider, and most of the value that underlies its earnings comes from the US market, not from innovations supplied by its parent DT. Thus, as between Germany and the US, it is likely that the US has the better claim to tax the gain portion of the $39 billion. Whatever contribution DT made is probably reflected in its basis in the shares, which is not taxable.
Why, then, is it US policy and practice not to tax gains on inbound FDI, given that the residence country is very unlikely to tax such gains? After all, under the single tax principle as articulated by US policy makers from T.S. Adams onward, double non-taxation amounts to "leaving money on the table."
The main reason we do not tax capital gains of non-residents is administrative: In the case of portfolio capital gains, it is very hard to administer the tax. The shares of US corporations are publicly traded on many foreign stock exchanges, and it would be very difficult for the US to enforce a tax on portfolio capital gains when both buyer and seller are non-residents and the buyer does not know whether there is a gain (and therefore cannot just withhold tax on the gross amount realized).
But this rationale does not apply to sales of large blocks of stock. In that case, the buyer wants to obtain the vote, and therefore the stock needs to be registered in its name. Before that happens, the seller needs to show the company that it filed a return and paid the tax. Capital gains tax on the sale of large blocks of stock is enforceable, just like the use tax on cars is enforceable because of the need to register the car. Capital gains tax on portfolio shares is not enforceable, like the use tax on other consumer items. Accordingly, the same OECD countries that grant an exemption from capital gains tax on sales of large blocks of shares by their residents sometimes tax such sales by non-residents. That is also the general policy of non-OECD countries like China and India. 5 While the OECD model treaty provides for residence taxation of all capital gains, the UN model permits source taxation of large blocks of shares, and so do many actual treaties of both OECD and non-OECD countries.
capital gains is a backstop to inadequate inbound transfer pricing enforcement, which leads to under-taxation of the subsidiary being sold. Second, in M&A frequently the price paid for the target is exaggerated beyond a reasonable present value of future earnings, which is a pure windfall to the selling parent. That was certainly true in BT/MCI where BT was outbid by Worldcom, which later had to exaggerate its earnings to justify the premium it paid. 5 See Avi-Yonah, Sartori and Marian, Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 10. The US has always followed the OECD model in exempting capital gains from source-based taxation in its model treaties. However, some US treaties with both OECD and non-OECD countries provide for source-based taxation of such gains. 6 In addition, the US has a model for taxing capital gains at source: it taxes such gains on real estate holdings and on the shares of US corporations whose value derives primarily from US real estate. This has been the case since FIRPTA, which was a treaty override enacted in 1980. The same policy is now included in most US treaties and in the US and OECD models.
In my view, it makes no sense to tax sales of real property at source but to exempt large capital gains. FIRPTA was enacted because of concerns that wealthy foreign investors (mostly from Japan and the Gulf) were buying prime US properties like Rockefeller Center and Palm Beach Golf Club at depressed prices because of a recession their countries were blamed for, and would reap large windfall gains when they sold. Those gains never materialized, and ultimately the foreign investors sold at a loss (in the case of Rockefeller Center, under bankruptcy protection). But even if there was a gain, the underlying properties could not be shipped to Tokyo or Dubai.
That is not true for acquisitions of US corporations. When a foreign multinational buys a US target, it can take away the most valuable element of the target, its IP and human capital, and transfer it overseas. It thus benefits from the US even when the acquisition does not produce a taxable gain. Daimler benefited in that way from the purchase of Chrysler, even though it lost money. When a foreign multinational acquires a US company and then sells it at a gain, that gain belongs at least in part to the US. That was true when BT sold MCI for a large gain and it also applies to the DT sale of T-Mobile. If BP were to sell Amoco, the gain would likewise largely be US source.
There is no reason for the US not to tax such large capital gains by foreign acquirers. The arguments in favor of such taxation are (a) that the gain stems largely from US source, (b) that such taxation is consistent with the current international norm, and (c) that the gain will not be taxed by the residence country and therefore not taxing it at source results in double non-taxation.
The arguments against taxation are weak. It will be said that taxation will hinder inbound foreign direct investment, but taxation does not seem to hinder 6 The following US treaties permit source taxation of capital gains from the sale of large participations: Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, India, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey. In all of those cases, under our current rules the other country gets to tax these capital gains but we do not. inbound FDI into China or the many other countries that apply such a tax. 7 It will be said that the tax can be avoided by using holding company structures, but China and India have shown that source countries can look through such structures. 8 Finally, it will be said that taxation is contrary to our treaty policy, but many of our treaties permit it, and in other cases they can be renegotiated or even (if Congress so wishes, as in FIRPTA) overridden. 9 In 1992, Chairman Rostenkowski introduced legislation that imposed US capital gains tax on foreign sellers of large blocks of shares (10 percent or more) in US corporations. The legislation was not a treaty override, although it added an anti-treaty shopping provision similar to those adopted for the branch profit tax in 1986. It also had anti-abuse provisions that addressed holding company structures.
Today, the US faces a large budget deficit and seeks to impose higher burdens on its own multinationals. While that is also justified, there is no reason to let foreigners off the hook, especially since there is much more inbound FDI now than there was in 1992. Congress should adopt the Rostenkowski legislation (reproduced below) now.
7 Multinationals have to be in the US for the same reason they have to be China: It's a huge market which is not moving anywhere. 8 Another argument is the "lock-in" effect of hindering business transactions, but that does not seem to have an impact on domestic taxable sales of subsidiaries. If the tax is a hindrance, a reorganization can achieve the same goal tax free (AT&T could give a bit more stock, since it is currently paying 64% of the consideration in cash; a reduction below 60% could perhaps qualify the transaction as an "A" reorganization.) 9 I have argued that treaty overrides are justified when the treaty results in double non-taxation, since that is contrary to the object and purpose of modern tax treaties. "(e) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN GAIN AS A DIVIDEND. --In the case of any gain which would be subject to tax by reason of this section but for a treaty and which results from any distribution in liquidation or redemption, for purposes of this subtitle, such gain shall be treated as a dividend to the extent of the earning, and profits of the domestic corporation attributable to the stock. Rules similar to the rules of section 1248(c) (determined without regard to paragraph (2)(D) thereof) shall apply for purposes of the preceding sentence. shall not apply to any disposition before the date 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) COORDINATION WITHIN TREATIES. foreign entity which is a resident of a foreign country shall be treated as a qualified resident of such foreign country if --"(i) interests in such entity are primarily and regularly traded on an established securities market in such country, or "(ii) such entity is not described in subparagraph (A)(ii) and such entity is wholly owned by another foreign entity which is organized in such foreign country and the interests in which are so traded. "(C) ENTITIES OWNED BY PUBLICLY TRADED DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS. --A foreign entity which is a resident of a foreign country shall be treated as a qualified resident of such foreign country if --"(i) such entity is not described in subparagraph (A)(ii) and such entity is wholly owned (directly or indirectly) by a domestic corporation, and "(ii) stock of such domestic corporation is primarily and regularly traded on an established securities market in the United States. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE. --The amendments made by this section shall take effect on January 1, 1993, and shall apply to any treaty whether entered into before, on, or after such date.
